In 2003 some 72% of Americans fully supported the Abandoning of the Missions and those Sent to Accomplish so extremely Quickly after 9/11!!

At least some 95%, if not more as less then 1% serve them, not only still support the, just below, total lack of Sacrifice, they ran from any and all Accountability and left everything still on the table to be continually used if the political/military want was still in play in future executive/legislative wants!!
DeJa-Vu: “With no shared sacrifices being asked of civilians after Sept. 11", Decades and War From, All Over Again!!

DEC. 21, 2014 - Prosecute Torturers and Their Bosses

‘Operation Inherent Resolve’

Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan

* * Operation Resolute Support * *

* * Iraq: 10 Years After, 19 March 2013 - Costs of War * *

CNN Map U.S. and Coalition Iraq/Afghanistan Casualties

Civilian Fatalities in Afghanistan, 2001–2012

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Friday, September 7, 2012

The 'September dossier' Case for War Against Iraq

Did the Iraq dossier damage democracy?
It's 10 years since the 'September dossier' built the case for war against Iraq. Two key players, Charles Falconer and Menzies Campbell, discuss its long-term impact

7 September 2012 - Menzies Campbell and Charles Falconer discuss the political legacy of the 2003 dossier on Iraq. Photograph: Martin Argles for the Guardian

This month sees the 10th anniversary of the September dossier, which formed the backbone of the case for the Iraq war. Sir Menzies Campbell was one of the few prominent politicians at the time to argue against intervention, while Lord Falconer, who was in the cabinet, became a supporter. So how do they reflect on the events of 10 years ago? Oliver Laughland chairs.

Menzies Campbell: The Liberal Democrat conference was taking place in Brighton but Charles Kennedy and I returned to the Commons because it had been recalled. We were sent a copy of the dossier and Charles handed it to me on the train. If you get something like that put in front of you, which appears authoritative, the likelihood is that you will accept it at face value. I almost certainly did. But I had always argued that regime change, which was clearly what the Amercians wanted, was illegal under article two of the UN charter. So we were [already] taking a very strong legal stance. What we said effectively was that we had seen this dossier but it didn't really change our position.

Charles Falconer: I was then minister of state at the Home Office responsible for criminal justice. Re-reading the document, as I did last night, I think it pretty accurately reflects what people thought the position was at the time. Namely that Saddam Hussein wanted to have weapons of mass destruction [WMD] – he's had some and we knew from intelligence that he was prepared to use them. read more>>>

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