Bush White House Resistant to Rebuilding Afghanistan
{Many of those in that Administration, in and on the fringes, knew full well that we, they, had walked away from the promises of rebuilding after we supplied arms to the Afghans during the Afghan/Soviet debacle. One can only surmise they were creating the atmosphere of greater hatreds thus enemies, the perpetual war against a stateless enemy many have talked about, by not wanting to help the Afghans rebuild from years of warfare after we invaded and did what the Soviets tried, install a more western friendly government and damn the people of!!}
Rumsfeld's War Aim: "Significantly Change the World's Political Map"
{See 'The New World Order' ideologies of the Neo-Con Hawks, tepublican party!}
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 358
Posted - September 11, 2011
Washington, DC, September 11, 2011 - In October 2001 the U.S. sent a private message to Taliban leader Mullah Omar warning that "every pillar of the Taliban regime will be destroyed," [Document 16] according to previously secret U.S. documents posted today by the National Security Archive at www.nsarchive.org. The document collection includes high-level strategic planning memos that shed light on the U.S. response to the attacks and the Bush administration's reluctance to become involved in post-Taliban reconstruction in Afghanistan. As an October 2001 National Security Council strategy paper noted, "The U.S. should not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement since the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism effort worldwide." [Document 18]Materials posted today also include memos from officials lamenting the American strategy of destroying al-Qaeda and the Taliban without substantially investing in Afghan infrastructure and economic well-being. In 2006, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald R. Neumann asserted that recommendations to "minimize economic assistance and leave out infrastructure plays into the Taliban strategy, not to ours." [Document 25] The Ambassador was concerned that U.S. inattention to Afghan reconstruction was causing the U.S. and its Afghan allies to lose support. The Taliban believed they were winning, he said, a perception that "scares the hell out of Afghans." [Document 26] Taliban leaders were capitalizing on America's commitment, he said, and had sent a concise, but ominous, message to U.S. forces: "You have all the clocks but we have all the time." [Document 25]
The documents published here describe multiple important post-9/11 strategic decisions. One relates to the dominant operational role played by the CIA in U.S. activities in Afghanistan. [Document 19] Another is the Bush administration's expansive post-9/11 strategic focus, as expressed in Donald Rumsfeld's remark to the president: "If the war does not significantly change the world's political map, the U.S. will not achieve its aim/ There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change." [Document 13] Yet another takes the form of U.S. communications with Pakistani intelligence officials insisting that Islamabad choose between the United States or the Taliban: "this was a black-and-white choice, with no grey." [Document 3 (Version 1)]
Highlights include: read more with document backlinks
Rumsfeld's War Aim: "Significantly Change the World's Political Map" -
No comments:
Post a Comment