In 2003 some 72% of Americans fully supported the Abandoning of the Missions and those Sent to Accomplish so extremely Quickly after 9/11!!

At least some 95%, if not more as less then 1% serve them, not only still support the, just below, total lack of Sacrifice, they ran from any and all Accountability and left everything still on the table to be continually used if the political/military want was still in play in future executive/legislative wants!!
DeJa-Vu: “With no shared sacrifices being asked of civilians after Sept. 11", Decades and War From, All Over Again!!

DEC. 21, 2014 - Prosecute Torturers and Their Bosses

‘Operation Inherent Resolve’

Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan

* * Operation Resolute Support * *

* * Iraq: 10 Years After, 19 March 2013 - Costs of War * *

CNN Map U.S. and Coalition Iraq/Afghanistan Casualties

Civilian Fatalities in Afghanistan, 2001–2012

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Saturday, March 5, 2011

Known and Unknown by donald rumsfeld – review

Philippe Sands is far from swayed by Donald Rumsfeld's apologia

5 March 2011 - Donald Rumsfeld's colourful and controversial public career is bookended by two big appointments: in November 1975 he became the youngest US secretary of defence; in December 2006 he was fired as the oldest holder of that office. In the interim, he served several presidents, came close to vice-presidential appointment and was actively engaged in commercial life. By any standard, his has been a rich and interesting life.


This over-long memoir is essentially an advocacy document. It has achieved some attention for the one big regret that is offered: his failure to resign when the images of abuse at Abu Ghraib became public. Beyond that, there is no apology for Iraq, Afghanistan or detainee abuse, and considerable hubris. His words may have been "ill-chosen" (for example in relation to the "stuff happens" comment about the looting in Baghdad), and he may have made the occasional "mis-statement" or "unintentional" comment. But for the most part he is unrepentant: the Bush administration basically "got it right" on the big issues, including Iraq, even if the policy cost a "high price" in terms of the lives of thousands of American servicemen and women and "hundreds of billions of dollars". The silence as to the costs on the lives and security of others is telling. He hints at responsibility, but can't actually articulate it.


A reasonable reader should therefore treat every factual assertion with caution. That applies to the partial, self-serving account of the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, a policy made on the hoof and without the application of critical thinking as to consequences. His case rests on such thin ice that he even invokes the Guardian for the proposition that there was broad support for the possibility of Saddam's involvement in 9/11. No citation is provided for that particular allegation. True, he recognises a failure of "deliberate, systematic" post-war planning, but this was the responsibility of others. There are nuggets that may be of interest to bodies such as the Chilcot inquiry. Astonishingly, he tells us that just one week before war began the administration finally agreed on an Iraqi Interim Authority, but the "exact timing and execution were left to be worked out". We also learn that President Bush "made the decision to go after Saddam Hussein" as early as 11 January 2003, making it clear that all that followed at the UN was a sham. {continued}

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